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Abstract 
Audit quality has been in the limelight for researchers over the last two to three decades. Researchers have 
endeavored to find out the factors that impact the quality of audit conducted by the auditors. The recent financial 
crises and financial scandals have further enhanced the importance of this topic. Although it is an empirically 
established fact that auditor’s performance is impeded by a number of factors that curb its independence 
however sudden surge in the emoluments of auditors during the last decades has actuated the researchers to study 
audit quality in context of compensation fee paid to the auditors. The results of studies differ as some are of the 
view that audit quality improves with the payment of excess fee while the rest are of the opposite view. 
Unluckily, Pakistan has been less explored in this regard and not even a single study has addressed the issue of 
audit quality in Pakistan. This study has attempted to analyze audit quality in context of abnormal or extra fee 
paid to auditor. Audit conducted without independence of auditor is futile and results in impairment of audit 
quality. Independence of auditor is usually curbed by extra fee paid to him, and auditor in fear of losing a 
lucrative fee does not report the misrepresentations of financial statements in his audit report. This study uses 
discretionary accruals as surrogate of audit quality which are computed by Cross-sectional Modified Jones 
Model (1995). The results are fortunately good for Pakistan and study has observed that auditors in Pakistan do 
not compromise on their standards and honesty when paid extra fee. In Pakistan, the quality of audit is not 
impaired when auditors are paid extra fee and the auditors work with diligence and exert extra effort to improve 
the audit quality. Therefore, the assertion that audit quality is impaired when high fee is paid to auditors does not 
hold well in Pakistan. 
Keywords: Audit fee, Audit Quality 
 
Introduction 
Auditor’s role in society is to assure interested third parties that corporate report and financial statements are true 
and fair reflection of company’s performance. In order to perform this role, it is essential that auditors are 
independent of client. Independence is necessary for performing quality audit (Dart, 2011). Thus it is necessary 
that auditor must make an independent opinion after the examination of financial statements. An audit would be 
futile if it is conducted without full independence because the independence of an auditor has major impact on 
the audit quality. It can be argued that the audit quality is a function of auditor independence (Larcker and 
Richardson, 2004).  
The independence of auditor can be curbed if the auditor is economically dependent upon the client. 
Economic dependence on client means that either the major share of auditor’s revenue comes from a single client 
or auditor is paid high above his expectations and efforts. Therefore, the study of audit quality in context of audit 
fee is an interesting issue which shall be explored in this study.Although the relationship between audit quality 
and audit fee is examined in various studies, but still the relationship isambiguous. There may be two different 
consequences of paying excess fee to auditor. The auditor may increase effort in the process of audit resulting in 
a higher quality of audit (Mitra et al., 2009); conversely, excess fee paid to auditor may make him dependent on 
his client and hence there is a threat of low audit quality (Choi et al., 2010). Auditor may not raise issues with the 
material misstatement of client because he has risk of losing a lucrative fee.    
It is believed that examining fees paid by firms to auditor in the context of auditor profitability better 
captures the relation between audit quality and auditor independence (Hoitash et al., 2005). Moreover, the 
auditor’s independence can be best analyzed by looking at the fees paid to them relative to their expected amount 
i.e. adjusted for their effort, time spent and risk. Therefore this study will explain the relationship between audit 
quality and audit fee by splitting audit fee into expected and unexpected (abnormal) component.  
The objective of this study is to analyze audit quality in context of Pakistan by using the discretionary 
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accruals as measure of audit quality. The audit quality is analyzed by examining its relationship with abnormal 
or excess audit fees. Audit fee can be divided into normal and abnormal fee (Choi et al., 2010). Normal fees are 
determined by the factors which are common across the clients such as size, complexity and client risk, while the 
abnormal fees are as a result of negotiation between the client and auditor and may be called as excess fees.  
Thus, the objective is to see whether the audit excess fee (abnormal fee) has an impact on audit quality or not. 
 
1.2 Purpose and significance of study 
Pakistan has not been explored much regarding auditing and therefore, a very scant literature is available in this 
regard. Previous audit studies conducted in Pakistan have focused audit fees and its determinants in Pakistan, 
while no study has emphasized the issue of audit quality. This study therefore, explores the relationship of audit 
fee and audit quality which has never been studied in Pakistan. 
 
1.3 Implications of study 
The practical advantage of this study is that it will help in assessing the performance of auditors and the quality 
of audit conducted by them when remunerated above their expectations. Moreover, the relationship between 
audit fee and audit quality is ambiguous and needs further evidence. The current study therefore, adds to the 
literature by providing the analysis of audit quality and its relationship with audit fees in context of Pakistan 
which has never been addressed in the past.This study will also explain auditor’s professionalism in Pakistan. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: next section reviews the literature of audit fee and its relationship 
with audit quality. Then the research strategy and methodology used to find out relationship of audit fee and 
audit quality is discussed. Next the statistical analysis and results generated from audit quality model are 
discussed. The last section concludes the study. 
 
Review of Literature 
2.1 Audit quality 
An audit would be of high quality if the auditor is fully independent while conducting the audit (DeAngelo, 
1981). The independence of auditor can be curbed by different factors and the important one among those factors 
is fee given by the client to auditor. An auditor dependent upon a particular client may conduct the audit in a 
lenient way and therefore compromise the quality of audit. The study of audit quality and audit fee is necessary 
as it helps both regulators and auditors to improve the audit quality standards. 
2.1.1 Audit (abnormal) fee and audit quality 
Literature of auditing shows mixed evidence regarding the relationship between high or abnormal fee paid to 
client and audit quality. It is said by researchers that high fee paid to the auditor may encourage him to put his 
maximum efforts in conducting the audit and disclose the material financial misstatements of his client. On the 
other side, high fee paid to auditor may make him economically dependent upon his client and the auditor will be 
reluctant to disclose material misstatements, if any, of the client. Some of the mixed evidences regarding 
(abnormal) audit fee and audit quality are discussed ahead. 
Larcker and Richardson (2004), conducted a study to find out the relationship between high (abnormal) 
fee paid by clients to auditing firms and quality of accruals in financial statements of client (audit quality). The 
study covers US market with 5103 firm year observations and time period of two years 2000-2001. Similar to 
previous studies, absolute discretionary accruals is used as proxy for audit quality and regressed on different 
measures of fee. Abnormal audit fee is considered for analysis instead of total fee to find out the audit quality 
when the auditors are paid excess of their remuneration and abnormal audit fee of auditor is found out from the 
residuals of traditional (Simunic, 1980) audit fee model. They say that the relationship between accruals (proxy 
for audit quality) and abnormal audit fee is positive only when the audit fee is measured by using ratio of non-
audit fee to total audit fee, otherwise there is no significant relationship between earnings quality and auditor’s 
independence. Larcker and Richardson (2004), say that the relationship between audit quality and audit fee is 
sensitive to the measures used for auditor independence. The overall results of their study suggest that auditors 
care about their reputation and ‘reputation protection’ refrains them from being lenient for a client in the audit of 
his financial misstatements. Therefore auditors do not compromise their independence even they are paid high 
fees. 
Contrary to above findings, Hoitash et al. (2007), in their study of auditor fee and audit quality find 
evidence that audit quality is impaired when auditors are paid high fee above their expectations. They say that 
the relationship between auditor’s independence and audit quality can be best described if the fees paid by client 
are analyzed in context of the profitability of auditor. The independence of auditor is thus influenced by the 
amount of fee relative to the auditor effort. Hoitash et al. (2007), say that an auditor may not raise objection with 
the misstatements of client who is paying him a lucrative fee and above the efforts done by him in conducting 
the audit. Hoitash et al. (2007), conduct their study by analysis of US market, taking 13860 observations for time 
period of four years 2000-2003. They use performance matched absolute discretionary accruals and current 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.7, 2015 
 
3 
accruals relating to cash flows as proxy for audit quality.  These both proxies for audit quality are regressed on 
total and abnormal audit fee. The result of their study shows that there is a significant positive relationship 
between (total and abnormal) fee and both type of accruals used as proxy for audit quality. The relationship was 
significant and positive in all the years of analysis. The results show that economic bonding between client and 
auditor leads to impairment of audit quality. Hoitash et al. (2007), conclude that an auditor if paid above his 
efforts and risk is likely to avoid any conflict with his client regarding material misstatements and thus 
compromise on the audit quality.  
Similar findings are shown by Choi et al. (2010), in their study of US market regarding audit quality 
and audit fee. Choi et al. (2010), say that the actual audit fee paid to auditor by a client consists of two parts i.e. 
normal and abnormal. Normal fees depend upon the factors which are common across all the clients. The normal 
fee of auditor can also be called as expected fee. The other part of actual audit fee i.e. abnormal fee is unusual 
and unexpected component of audit fee. The abnormal fee depends upon the auditor client relationship and 
negotiation power of both auditor and client. Choi et al. (2010), conduct their study by using 2081 firm year 
observations covering time period from 2000 to 2003. Similar to previous studies, absolute discretionary 
accruals is used as proxy for audit quality and regressed on abnormal audit fee. The results of their study show 
that there is a significant positive relationship between abnormal audit fee and discretionary accruals (inverse 
measure of audit quality) when the abnormal fees are positive. While the relationship between abnormal audit 
fee and audit quality is insignificant when the abnormal fees are negative or less than expectations. It means that 
the auditors which are paid high above their expectations compromise on audit quality and they think that high 
fee can outweigh the risk and costs associated with litigation or reputation loss. This study also shows that when 
auditors are not paid above their expectations then they do not compromise on audit quality as they have less 
incentives and more loss to suffer in case of litigation or audit failure. 
The study done by Mitra et al. (2009), negates the conclusion drawn by the study of Hoitash et al. 
(2007), and Choi et al (2010). Mitra et al. (2009), conducted a study of US market to test the audit quality and 
audit fee relationship. They say that independence of an auditor can be impaired if an auditor gets unexpected 
high fee from his client.  Study uses a sample of 1142 firms covering time period of six years i.e. 2000 to 2005. 
Similar to previous studies, performance matched discretionary accruals are used as proxy for audit quality and 
computed from modified cross-sectional Jones model (Dechow, 1995). The audit fee is split into two 
components expected (normal) and unexpected fee (abnormal). The results of study show that the amount of 
discretionary accruals had negative relationship with both expected and unexpected fee. Mitra et al. (2009), say 
that the high fees paid to auditors do not curb their independence rather it helps in improving the quality of audit. 
Auditors exert extra effort in improving the audit quality and this shows that auditors care about their reputation 
and honesty.  
Kraub et al. (2011), find out the results contrary to the findings of Mitra et al. (2009), Kraub et al. 
(2011), tested the relationship of audit quality and audit fee in German market. Study uses a sample of 717 firms 
and the period of study is from 2004 to 2009. Audit quality is measured with two proxies i.e. accounting 
restatement or error announcements and discretionary accruals. Similar to previous studies, abnormal fee is used 
instead of total fee in analysis. They say that abnormal fees can be called as attempted bribe to auditors and 
clients by giving abnormal fees to auditors urge the auditors not to object or raise questions at the financial 
misstatements and earnings management. The results of study show that both proxies for audit quality have 
positive relationship with the positive abnormal fee. The auditors which get positive abnormal fee from their 
clients allow the clients to indulge in earnings management resulting in lowered audit quality.  Results show that 
the auditors which get positive abnormal fees from clients do not want to leave those clients and the benefits of 
staying with the same client are far more than the costs associated with the audit failure of that client which may 
result in reputation loss. Thus the study suggests that the independence of auditors is curbed by the abnormal 
fees, and the auditors getting abnormal fee greater than their expectations (i.e. positive abnormal fee) do not 
disclose the financial misstatements or earnings management of their client(s).  
Lin and Hwang (2010), conducted a meta-analysis of studies conducted regarding audit fee and their 
impact on audit quality. They say that earnings management has been used as proxy for audit quality in almost 
all the studies of auditing. Earnings management occurs when manager use their own judgment in financial 
reporting to alter the financial reports. These alterations done by managers are either meant to mislead the 
stockholders about the performance of company or to attain personal benefits (which are contingent with the 
profitability of company).  Lin and Hwang (2010), say that the audit quality is multidimensional and 
unobservable; therefore a single trait or characteristic of auditor can’t be the surrogate for the quality of audit 
conducted.  Lin and Hwang (2010), conducted the meta-analysis on 27 studies (till 2006) related to earnings 
management (audit quality) and audit fee. Their results suggest that high audit fee charged by auditor is 
negatively related to the quality of audit. This means that high fee charged by auditor impairs his independence 
and thus the auditor becomes economically dependent upon the client which lowers the quality of audit. Lin and 
Hwang (2010), say that if the auditor is given fee in commensurate to his efforts then the quality of audit is not 
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lowered. The results of this study, however, cannot be generalized due to the fact that the study was conducted 
using only 27 studies which are quite less.  
Similar kinds of findings are shown by Asthana and Boon (2012), in their study of US market. They 
explore relationship between abnormal fee and audit quality. Asthana and Boon (2012), say that auditors are 
hired by clients and compensated by clients for their efforts which creates and economic bonding between client 
and audit. They say that greater economic bonding between auditor and client degrades audit quality. Asthana 
and Boon (2012), say that the fact economic bonding undermines audit quality depends upon expected costs and 
benefits of auditor. Study tests assertion that abnormal fee impairs audit quality. Absolute discretionary accruals 
is used as proxy for audit quality which is calculated by cross-sectional modified jones model. This study uses 
140796 observations and covers a time period of ten years i.e. 2000-2009. Results of the study show that 
abnormal audit fee impairs audit quality and hypothesis of Asthana and Boon (2012), holds true. 
Keeping in view the conflicting evidences regarding (abnormal) audit fee and audit quality, this study 
will add to literature by providing empirical evidence about relationship of audit fee and audit quality. 
 
Research strategy and methodology 
This section discusses the methods and techniques to find out the relationship of auditor fee with audit quality.  
 
3.1 Data and sample size 
This study uses secondary data and the companies listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) 100 index have been 
included in the study. The reasons for selecting companies from KSE-100 index are that, KSE-100 index is 
deemed to be the representative of corporate sector of Pakistan and largest stock exchange of Pakistan in terms 
of market capitalization. Moreover, the study uses amount of audit fee paid by companies and only the 
companies listed on KSE-100 index are bound to disclose the audit fee in the footnotes of their annual reports 
(Section 230, Companies Ordinance 1984).The study uses convenient sampling because of data availability 
issues and only non-financial firms have been used in the study due to the differing asset structure and revenue 
generation pattern of financial firms. Moreover, audit quality studies rarely include financial companies because 
those companies do not have necessary data for analysis. The data covers whole sectors of KSE-100 index and at 
least ten companies should be selected from a single sector otherwise results of cross sectional Modified Jones 
Model would not be valid (Dechow, 1995).   
Additionally, a company is included in the analysis if it meets the following criteria: 
• It should have annual reports from the year 2007 to 2011 
• It should have disclosed audit fee in all of the years under analysis 
• It should have generated sales in all of its years under analysis 
On the basis of above criteria and restriction of choosing at least ten companies from single sector, 150 
companies from seven sectors were selected for the analysis. Annual reports of each company were retrieved 
from its website. 
The following table describes the number of companies included in the sample from each sector.  
Table 3.1 Sector wise summary of companies selected in the sample 
S.No Name of Sector Number of Companies 
1 Automobile 10 
2 Chemicals 16 
3 Construction & Cement 23 
4 Food Producers 20 
5 General Industries 11 
6 Oil Sector 11 
7 Textile 59 
 Total 150 
Number of companies included in the sample from textile sector is highest because this sector has got 
the highest number of companies among all sectors of KSE-100 index. Following graph displays the proportion 
of each sector in total sample. 
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Graph 3.1 Proportion of each sector in sample 
 
 
3.2 Audit quality 
3.2.1 Measurement of audit quality 
This section describes the method and process of finding audit quality. Audit quality is analyzed in context of 
high payment of audit fee i.e. abnormal audit fee. First the proxy for audit quality is discussed and after that audit 
quality of auditors is analyzed in context of high audit fee. 
Audit quality is an unobservable attribute and therefore, a single characteristic or trait of auditor cannot 
describe the audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981). Researchers therefore use different proxies for assessing the audit 
quality. Discretionary accruals are the most common proxy to gauge the audit quality and, therefore this study 
uses discretionary accruals as proxy for audit quality. Discretionary accruals show the managerial interference 
into financial reporting process. Moreover, discretionary accruals show the extent to which managers manipulate 
earnings and therefore disclose the level of earnings management by managers (Choi et al., 2010). Therefore, if 
the level of discretionary accruals is high then one can say that managers are involved in earnings management. 
High level of discretionary accruals and earnings management thus reveals that audit quality is low as auditors 
are unable to find and report the earnings management.  
Healy (1985), first used accrual based approach for finding out the earnings management. However, 
difficulty in this approach is to decompose accruals into managed (discretionary) and unmanaged (non-
discretionary) components (Peasnell et al., 2000). The most common method for finding out discretionary 
accruals is cross-sectional modified Jones model (Dechow, 1995, 2002). It is a precise measure of discretionary 
accruals and it can decompose accruals into both discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. A study by 
Peasnell et al. (2000), shows that cross sectional modified Jones model is the most powerful at detecting 
manipulations than the time-series model. 
 
Modified Jones Model 
This study uses modified Jones model (Dechow, 1995) with adjustment of performance variable as the 
performance of a firm results in misspecification (Kothari, 2005).  
Model 1: 
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Where; 
TACC = Total Accruals, difference between Earnings (before extraordinary items and discontinued operations) 
and operating cash flow (OCF).  
TAt-1 = Total lagged Assets 
∆REV = Change in Revenue from previous year to this year 
∆REC = Change in Receivables from start to end of the year 
PPE = Property, plant and equipment 
Automobile
7%
Chemicals
11%
Construction & 
Cement
15%
Food Producers
13%
General 
Industries
7%
Oil
7%
Textile
40%
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ROAt-1 = Lagged Return on Assets which is calculated as net income before extraordinary items of prior period 
divided by lagged total assets 
ε is the error term which indicates the discretionary accruals.  
The modified model is designed to reduce the measurement error of discretionary accruals when 
discretion is applied over sale (Dechow, 1995). This modified version of the Jones model (1991) assumes that all 
changes in uncollected credit sales at the end of the event period result from earnings management. The 
reasoning behind this modification is that earnings are easier to manage via credit sales than cash collections.  
Discretionary accruals are found by estimating the model by industry year estimation process i.e., the 
Discretionary accruals of firms from different industry are estimated separately. The estimates from the above 
equation are used to find out non-discretionary accruals which are then subtracted from total accruals to find out 
the discretionary accruals. Hence: 
 
Model 2: 
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Where NDACC is non-discretionary accruals and a, b', b(and	b+  are estimates of respectively.  
Non-discretionary accruals for every firm are calculated and then subtracted from total accruals to find out 
discretionary accruals of that firm.   
Total Accruals =  Discretionary Accruals + Non-Discretionary Accruals  
 TACC = DACC    +      NDACC 
Discretionary Accruals=        Total Accruals – Non-Discretionary Accruals 
DACC  = TACC      –     NDACC 
The estimation process is cross sectional and Discretionary accruals for each company are estimated separately. 
In this study absolute discretionary accruals (ABDISC) is used which will capture the effect of both income 
increasing and income decreasing accruals (Mitra et al, 2009). Absolute discretionary accruals have no sign. 
Following table describes about the variables and their definition: 
Table 3.2 Variables along with the definitions (Modified Jones Model) 
Dependent Variable: TACC  
Variable Definition: Total Accruals, difference between Earnings (before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations) and operating cash flow (OCF). 
Independent Variable Variable Definition 
∆REV Change in Revenue from previous year to current year 
∆REC Change in Receivables previous year to current year 
PPE Property, plant and equipment 
ROAt-1 
Lagged Return on Assets, calculated as net income before extraordinary 
items of prior period divided by lagged total assets 
TAt-1 =  Total lagged Assets (Previous year assets) 
3.2.2 Abnormal audit fee and audit quality 
Abnormal audit fee is the fee paid to auditor above or below his expectations. It can be positive or negative 
(Choi et al, 2010). The case of abnormal fee arises when auditors feel they are not given audit fee in 
commensurate with their efforts. Abnormal fee, as described, can have both positive and negative consequences. 
It can raise the level of audit quality or can impair the audit quality. First the process of finding audit quality is 
discussed and after that audit quality is analyzed in context of abnormal audit fee. 
Abnormal audit fee 
Abnormal audit fee is quite simple to calculate and the process is similar to that of absolute discretionary 
accruals. First, predicted or expected audit fee is found with the help of following model that is used to 
determine factors of audit fee: 
Model 3: 
, 	∝ 		./0 		/12  	.3  4	2  5	6  7	86..  9	:/34  ;	< =	>12  	 
Where; 
∝ = intercept 
?@AA = Natural log of audit fees 1charged by auditor 
BCDE = Natural log of Total assets  
                                                          
1
Natural log of audit fee and assets is used to linearize the relationship between audit fee and firm size. 
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INVREC = Inventory plus receivables  
SEG = Square root of number of business segments in which the company operates 
CR = Liquidity measure (current ratio).  
ROA = Return on Assets.  
LOSS = Dummy variable for loss. Equal to 1 if firm experienced a loss during the year.  
BIG4 = Dummy variable for Big 4 firm. Equal to 1 if the auditing firm is from BIG4 
YEAR = Dummy variable for year end. Equal to 1 if the financial year of company ends on 30th    June  
MNC = Dummy variable for origin of company. Equal to 1 if firm is Multinational company.  
ε = Error Term 
Following are the steps involved in finding abnormal audit fee: 
1. Estimates of equation (from Model 3) which is used for determining audit fee are used to find out predicted or 
expected audit fee i.e. 
E ,  	F	  	#./0 	#/12  #.3  #42  #56  #786..  #9:/34  #;< 
#=>12 
Where EAFEE is expected audit fee and a, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8 and b9 are estimates of , β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, 
β6, β7, β8 and β9. Unlike, modified Jones model for finding discretionary accruals, the audit fee equation is not 
estimated separately for every industry rather all are estimated at once.  
2. Once estimates are obtained, expected audit fee for every firm is calculated.  
3. This estimate is in form of natural log so exponent of value is taken to convert it into rupees form. 
4. After that the amount is subtracted from actual audit fee to get abnormal audit fee: 
Abnormal Audit Fee = Actual Audit Fee – Expected Audit Fee 
The abnormal audit fee can be positive or negative (Choi et al, 2010). If abnormal fee is positive, then auditor 
considers the actual audit fee above his expectations and efforts. While the negative abnormal fee suggest that 
auditor expected more than the actual amount paid to him. 
Audit quality and abnormal audit Fee 
After abnormal fee and discretionary accruals for each firm is found, analysis is made regarding the audit quality 
in context of abnormal audit fee. Following model is used for finding out the audit quality: 
Model 4: 
:G/.2  	H 	:, 	:/3	4  ∆.8. 	48 	586.. 	72,6  9./0  			 
Where; 
ABDISC = Absolute Discretionary Accruals 
ABFEE = Abnormal Audit Fee 
BIG 4 = Dummy variable for Big 4 firm 
∆SALES = Change in sales from previous year to this year 
LEV = Leverage variable 
LOSS = Dummy variable for loss 
CFO = Cash flow from operations 
SIZE = Size of client’s business 
Absolute Discretionary Accruals (ABDISC) and Abnormal Audit Fee (ABFEE) are described earlier 
and rest of variables included in the model are control variables which need to be elaborated. 
Control Variables 
Following are the control variables used in the audit quality model which control for either absolute 
discretionary accruals or abnormal audit fee: 
BIG 4 
Research has shown that Big 4 or their affiliated audit firms restrict their clients in earnings management and 
therefore the true relationship of audit quality may not be observed (Choi et al, 2010). The reason is that Big 4 
firms care for their reputation (reputation hypothesis) and therefore they ensure that their client is not engaged in 
activities that result in manipulation of earnings. Therefore, Big 4 dummy variable has been included in the 
model to control for such effect and its value equals 1 if the auditing firm is affiliated with Big 4 auditing firms.  
Change in Sales (∆BNOEP 
Change in sales is calculated as difference in sales of company from previous year to this year. This variable is 
included to control for earnings management and hence discretionary accruals. Research has shown that growth 
effects can impact earnings management of a company (Hoitash et al, 2007). Therefore,  is used to 
control for potential growth effect on earnings management. 
Leverage (LEV) 
Leverage of a company is calculated as total liabilities divided by its total assets. Companies which have high 
leverage can boost their earnings management (Mitra et al, 2009), and therefore, leverage variable is included to 
control for such effects.  
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LOSS 
Behaviour of company’s manager can change if he foresees loss in his company. He can manipulate earnings 
either to retain his job and bonuses, or to retain the shareholders of company. He may manipulate accounting 
figures to show that the company is not in losses and has a bright and viable future. Therefore, it can be said that 
loss in a company may result in more likelihood of earnings management than a company which is not facing 
loss. Value of LOSS variable is equal to 1 if the firm faces loss in year of analysis. 
CFO (Cash flow from operations) 
Kothari et al. (2005), find out that discretionary accruals and firm performance have positive relationship. 
Therefore, firm performance can impact earnings management or discretionary accruals. CFO (cash flow from 
operations) variable has been included to control for such effect because cash flow from operations is usually 
considered as measure of company’s performance. Cash flow from operations or operating activities is given in 
the financial statements of companies. 
Size 
It has been seen that earnings management is quite low in large firms due to their stability therefore SIZE 
variable is included and use to control the size effect (Dechow and Delv, 2002). It is calculated by taking natural 
log of assets. Moreover, firms large in size tend to pay high to auditors and therefore, the level of abnormal fee 
can surge (Hoitash et al, 2007). SIZE variable therefore controls for both discretionary accruals and abnormal fee.  
Following table describes about the variables and their definition: 
Table 3.3 Variables along with the definitions (Audit quality and abnormal audit fee) 
Dependent Variable: ABDISC 
 Variable Definition: Absolute discretionary accruals (proxy for audit quality) 
Independent Variable Variable Definition 
ABFEE Abnormal Audit Fee 
Control Variables  
BIG 4 
Dummy variable for Big 4 firm, equal to 1 if the auditing firm is an 
affiliate of Big 4 firm 
 Change in sales, current year’s sales less previous year’s sale 
LEV Leverage, calculated by total liabilities over total assets 
LOSS 
Dummy variable for loss, equal to 1 if the company faces loss in year of 
analysis 
CFO Cash flow from operations 
SIZE Size of client’s business measured by natural log of total assets 
If the relationship is negative between absolute discretionary accruals and abnormal audit fee, then it 
can be concluded that audit quality gets higher when high fee is paid to auditors and they perform more 
diligently to control for manipulations and earning management. Auditors, therefore care for their reputation and 
do not compromise on standards (Mitra et al., 2009, Larcker and Richardson, 2004, Choi et al, 2010). While if 
the relationship is positive between the absolute discretionary accruals and abnormal audit fee, then conclusion 
can be drawn that the independence of auditors gets curbed by high payment of audit fee and they compromise 
on their standards and do not care for reputation. They only want to earn profit from audit and do not report 
misrepresentations of their client in fear of losing a lucrative audit fee (De Angelo, 1981). Audit quality and 
audit fee relationship is further tested by splitting audit fee into predicted audit fee (PFEE) and abnormal audit 
fee (ABFEE). PFEE and ABFEE are components of actual total audit fees, which influence the auditor’s 
economic rationality in the course of planning and executing an audit. Hence, it is appropriate to evaluate the 
association of both variables with audit fees in the same analysis rather than testing the association of each to the 
exclusion of the other in the model (Mitra et al, 2009).  
 
3.3 Statement of Hypothesis 
This study will test the following hypothesis: 
“There is no relationship between audit quality and abnormal (excess) audit fee” 
 
3.4 Estimation Techniques 
As the study intends to find out the determinants of audit fee and relationship between audit fee and audit quality, 
so Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation method is used for this purpose.Moreover, modified Jones model 
(Dechow, 1995), used for finding out discretionary accruals, is estimated cross-sectionally because of following 
reasons: 
• In order to use a time series modified Jones model, data of at least seven or ten years is required 
(Dechow, 2002) 
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• Due to lengthy time period involved, time-series model can get misspecified due to non-stationarity 
(Subramanyam, 1996) 
• Cross-sectional model enhances sample size 
• Cross-sectional modified Jones model is better specified than any other model used for detecting 
discretionary accruals (Bartov, Gul and Tsui, 2001) 
The relationship between audit quality and audit fee is also checked by cross-sectional estimation method. Audit 
fee model (used for finding out the determinants of audit fee) is estimated on cross-sectional basis to find out 
abnormal fee for each year. Descriptive statistics are used to describe the variables present in the study. 
 
Results and discussion 
This section explains the statistical analysis and results of OLS estimation. Descriptive statistics are also 
explained in these sections.  
 
4.1Audit quality 
Relationship between absolute discretionary accruals (proxy for audit quality) and audit fee is shown in the table: 
Table 4.1 OLS results of Audit quality and Abnormal fee 
Dependent Variable (ABSDISC) 
Indep 
Variables 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 β p-value β p-value β p-value β p-value β p-value 
Intercept 0.4017 0.0106** 0.2595 0.0279** -0.0902 0.3345 0.1392 0.1261 0.1358 0.2095 
ABFEE 8.23E-08 0.4549 -1.10E-07 0.0353** -7.91E-08 0.0163** 1.74E-08 0.3658 7.85E-09 0.6547 
SIZE -0.0154 0.0320** -0.0097 0.0635 -0.0086 0.0474** -0.0043 0.3043 -0.0035 0.4797 
LEV 0.0085 0.8333 0.0708 0.0318** -0.0190 0.4885 0.0299 0.1982 0.0123 0.5594 
SALES -6.95E-12 0.3362 2.89E-12 0.2188 -3.78E-12 0.0850 1.65E-12 0.3818 4.58E-13 0.7000 
CFO 
1.28E-11 0.2059 -2.29E-13 0.9690 -3.91E-12 0.3382 
-5.41E-
12 0.1612 
-4.58E-
12 0.2545 
BIG4 -0.0376 0.0474** -0.0141 0.2546 -0.0028 0.7972 -0.0252 0.0231** -0.0061 0.5861 
LOSS -0.0131 0.4885 -0.0365 0.0050** -0.0091 0.4334 -0.0224 0.0846 -0.0014 0.9086 
R2 0.069127 0.155440 0.078776 0.076416 0.025967 
Adjusted R2 0.023239 0.113806 0.033364 0.030888 -0.022049 
*Significant at 1 percent      **Significant at 5 percent 
Where ABFEE is abnormal fee, SIZE is proxy for client’s size of business measured by natural log of 
assets, LEVERAGE is proportion of leverage in business measured by total debt over total assets,  Sales is 
change in sales from previous year to current year, CFO is cash flow from operations, BIG4 is proxy for big 4 
firm, LOSS is proxy for loss. 
Looking at the OLS results it is observed that, relationship between absolute discretionary accruals and 
audit fee is significantly negative in year 2008 and 2009. This means that if the auditors are paid high fee they 
spend extra time and exert extra effort to improve the audit quality (Mitra et al, 2009). The negative relationship 
means that absolute discretionary accruals get low as fee for auditors are above their expectations. It means that 
auditors perform their duties with more diligence when they are paid high fee above their expectations and do 
their best to stop earnings management. This relationship means that auditor’s independence is not impaired by 
high audit fee and therefore, audit quality is not impacted by high audit fee (Larcker and Richardson, 2004). 
Further it can be seen from OLS results that variables SIZE and BIG4 (proxies for client’s size of 
business and big4 auditors respectively) show significant negative relationship with absolute discretionary 
accruals. This shows that businesses or clients which are larger in size reduce or control absolute discretionary 
accruals and therefore audit quality is high in large businesses (Dechow and Delv, 2002). Moreover negative 
relationship of BIG4 variable (proxy for big4 firm) with absolute discretionary accruals show that big4 firms 
also control absolute discretionary accruals and therefore audit quality is high in clients which are audited by 
big4 firms than the clients which are audited by non-big4 firms (Sun et al., 2011). 
The relationship between (abnormal) audit fee and audit quality is further analyzed by splitting audit 
fee into expected (predicted) and unexpected (abnormal) audit fee. The results of analysis by splitting audit fee 
into predicted fee and abnormal fee are shown below: 
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Table 4.2 OLS results of audit quality after segregation of audit fee 
Dependent Variable (ABSDISC) 
Indep 
Variables 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 β p-value β p-value β p-value β p-value β p-value 
Intercept 0.5570 0.0345** 0.1941 0.2917 -0.1861 0.2647 0.1699 0.2864 0.1818 0.2137 
ABFEE 8.38E-08 0.4480 -1.10E-07 0.0358** -8.24E-08 0.0135** 1.73E-08 0.3712 6.28E-09 0.7261 
PFEE 1.77E-07 0.4600 -5.08E-08 0.6441 -3.94E-08 0.4869 6.89E-09 0.8183 1.05E-08 0.6381 
SIZE -0.0247 0.0892 -0.00597 0.5358 -0.0136 0.1089 -0.0058 0.4587 -0.0058 0.4068 
LEV 0.0125 0.7585 0.0681 0.0426** -0.0149 0.5968 0.0290 0.2215 0.0114 0.5891 
SALES -8.45E-12 0.2614 3.35E-12 0.1907 -3.76E-12 0.0867 1.51E-12 0.4473 9.06E-14 0.9493 
CFO 1.00E-11 0.3554 2.64E-13 0.9649 -3.21E-12 0.4460 -5.61E-12 0.1577 -5.41E-12 0.2192 
BIG4 -0.0283 0.2145 0.0180 0.2296 0.0076 0.5582 -0.0244 0.0385** -0.0048 0.6808 
LOSS -0.0062 0.7851 -0.0377 0.0046* -0.0122 0.3291 -0.0215 0.1171 -0.0014 0.9013 
R2 0.072737 0.156722 0.081940 0.076763 0.027499 
Adjusted R2 0.020126 0.108876 0.029852 0.024381 -0.027678 
*Significant at 1 percent **Significant at 5 percent level 
Where ABFEE is abnormal fee, PFEE is predicted or expected fee, SIZE is proxy for client’s size of 
business measured by natural log of assets, LEVERAGE is proportion of leverage in business measured by total 
debt over total assets, Sales is change in sales from previous year to current year, CFO is cash flow from 
operations, BIG4 is proxy for big 4 firm, LOSS is proxy for loss. 
Results show that even after the segregation of audit fee into expected (predicted) and unexpected 
component, the unexpected or abnormal audit fee shows a significant negative relationship with absolute 
discretionary accruals. This shows that auditors do not exert extra effort on the basis of their predicted or 
expected fee rather they exert extra effort only when paid high above their expectations. They pay back the extra 
audit fee by working in an effective manner to ensure audit quality is not compromised. 
Results support the fact that auditors care for their reputation and do not succumb to lucrative fees 
given by clients. Therefore, seventh hypothesis is rejected and it can be concluded that auditors in Pakistan care 
for their reputation and put extra effort to improve audit quality. Thus audit quality is not impaired even if 
auditors are paid high fee above their expectations. 
 
Conclusion 
This study examines a sample of 150 firms during the period 2007-2011 to explore relationship between audit 
fee and audit quality in Pakistan. Results indicate audit quality in Pakistan is not a problem when high fee is paid 
to the auditors as shown by results. The independence of auditors is not curbed by payment of high audit fee and 
auditors do not compromise on audit quality. In Pakistan, auditors work harder than before and ensure a high 
quality of audit is done when they are paid extra fee above their expectations. No result show that auditors 
compromise on audit quality when they are paid high fee than their expectations. The result is further supported 
by splitting audit fee into normal or predicted audit fee and abnormal audit fee. Therefore, the assertion that 
auditors compromise their standards when paid extra fee is rejected in Pakistan. Auditors in Pakistan do not 
compromise on their values for lucrative audit fee and instead they work with more diligence to ensure high 
quality audit.  
This study, however, has certain limitations. The analysis is limited to 150 companies due to the 
availability of data which may limit in generalization of results. As audit quality cannot be measured with 
accuracy and therefore no exact proxy exists for measuring audit quality. This research uses discretionary 
accruals as the proxy for audit quality, so it may not completely reflect the actual audit quality.  
Future researchers can focus upon certain issues not addressed in this study. For instance inclusion of 
corporate governance measures in analysis of audit quality (and audit fee) will lead to a better explanation of 
audit fee and audit quality. Further, the independence of auditor and its impact on audit quality can be analyzed 
in depth by segregating audit fee into audit and non-audit fee. 
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